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Canuel: From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune Ecole

FROM A PRESTIGE FLEET TO THE JEUNE ÉCOLE
French Naval Policy and Strategy under the Second Empire and
the Early Third Republic (1852–1914)
Hugues Canuel

T

he latter half of the mid-nineteenth century was a period of tremendous
and continuous naval transformation—much like the current time. In many
ways, twenty-first-century politicians and admirals are arguing in a climate of
uncertainty reminiscent of that surrounding the debates that took place in those
earlier years. As today, authorities then sought to conciliate conflicting views
shaped by the rapid introduction of expensive technologies at sea, the rise of
new contenders seeking to challenge the dominating naval power through direct
competition or asymmetric warfare, and the ongoing competition for funding
among military services that could not agree on a common strategy to face different enemies.
These parallels are not a new idea, and several authors have explored this
theme in past years, such as renowned British historian Paul M. Kennedy, who
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recent years except for Norwegian author Arne Røksund’s 2007 volume on the
Jeune École, offers an alternative source of relevant insight.3 Napoleon III proclaimed an egotistical Second Empire in 1852, only to see it go down to humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. From the ashes of empire
arose the Third Republic, but the latter would suffer its own dramatic loss of face
as a result of France’s last major diplomatic confrontation with Great Britain, the
Fashoda crisis of 1898.
Within that time span, France initially proved capable of leveraging the
extraordinary technological revolution then under way to assemble a potent
naval force, second only to that of its nemesis, the Royal Navy (RN). Even as the
French force grew in size and complexity, it often was described as the emperor’s
“prestige fleet”; without a defined strategy, it seemed unable to contribute to
the defense of the nation in 1870. Under the Third Republic, proponents of the
Jeune École first formulated a strategy founded on these same technological
advances to shape a different fleet, one trumpeted as being capable of undermining Great Britain’s superiority at sea through what would be labeled asymmetry today. This policy also proved flawed, as the Marine nationale failed to
make a difference during the 1898 confrontation on the upper reaches of the
Nile River.4
The period in question illustrates the requirement for naval policy and strategy to be coordinated closely and founded on a realistic appraisal of a country’s
security and foreign policy needs; an objective assessment of the technologies
available; and the careful acquisition of naval advice whose independence from
national politics and party affiliation is preserved, so that enduring political support for a single, long-term shipbuilding program can be secured. This article
will show that the naval policy pursued under the Second Empire generated a
viable, balanced fleet, but lack of a clearly formulated strategic purpose seemingly
left it irrelevant during France’s hour of greatest need. The Jeune École then put
a narrow strategy ahead of the practical limitations that any viable policy must
take into account when funding the building of a fleet. Both approaches failed,
leaving a bitter legacy that greatly affected France’s ability to leverage sea power
to mitigate its difficult position on the eve of the First World War.
First, though, this article must review earlier naval developments, shaped
as they were by those same effervescent technological developments at sea and
contrasting geopolitical ambitions on land that would continue to affect French
naval thought for the remainder of the nineteenth century. In the wake of the
Napoleonic Wars, technical achievements and developments on the international
scene quickly persuaded the country’s leadership of the importance of sea power,
but debates over the shape this instrument should take endured through the
remainder of the century.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7

Winter2018Review.indb 94

2

11/1/17 9:56 AM

Canuel: From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune Ecole

CANUEL

95

FROM ONE EMPEROR TO THE NEXT
French inventors of varied backgrounds often took the lead in developing the
technologies that came to revolutionize war at sea in the decades that followed
the downfall of Emperor Napoleon I. By far the most transformational element
during that early period was the use of steam for propulsion, to escape the vagaries of wind power. In 1824, engineer Jean Baptiste Marestier traveled overseas
to study this potent tool and published a monograph that was well ahead of its
time, A Memoir on Steamboats of the United States of America.5 The naval budget
of 1826 included funds for building four vessels to experiment with steam propulsion, and France’s first successful steam warship, the 910-ton paddle steamer
Sphinx, was launched in 1829.6 Inventor Pierre Sauvage then patented the propeller, whose placement below the waterline at the stern of the vessel alleviated the
disadvantages of having large paddle wheels affixed to a ship’s sides; the concept
was tested with the construction of the dispatch vessel Le Corse in 1843.7 Such
tremendous progress led to the launch of Napoléon in 1850, the first purposebuilt steam battleship in the world and the lead ship of a class of nine such vessels built over the following decade. Napoléon carried ninety guns and used the
combination of steam and propeller to reach a speed of fourteen knots (while
keeping a sail and rigging as a secondary means of propulsion for economical
long-distance cruising).8
In parallel with these technological advances, events on the world scene following the Bourbon Restoration of 1815 convinced France’s political leadership
of the necessity to rebuild a credible navy. Spikes of instability and low-level
conflicts flared up frequently as a result of the slow decay of the Ottoman Empire
and of Spain, necessitating intervention by warships to defend French interests in
Europe and overseas. A military revolt in Cádiz prompted Paris to dispatch army
and naval forces to Spain in 1823 to support the Bourbon king Ferdinand VII,
while taking the side of the insurgents against the Ottomans during the Greek
War of Independence in 1821–30.9 France maintained naval forces in the Levant
throughout these years, even forming a combined fleet with Great Britain and
Russia that destroyed a Turkish-Egyptian force anchored in the Bay of Navarino
in 1827, the last major naval battle of the sail era.10 Paris also dispatched naval
vessels in 1831 during civil unrest in Portugal and to Ancona, on Italy’s Adriatic
coast, because of fighting among Italian nationalists, Austrian troops, and the
Papal States.11
Spanish withdrawal from South America and the Caribbean, as well as the
degeneration of Ottoman influence in North Africa, led to repeated naval expeditions to tame virulent piracy through the reigns of French kings Charles X
(1824–30) and Louis Philippe (1830–48). These often included punitive raids
against cities and local potentates who provided safe havens to the pirates.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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In the case of Algeria, such raids failed to provide a permanent solution to the
threat the Barbary corsairs posed, leading to the occupation of Algiers in 1830
and the eventual annexation of the entire Algerian coast over the course of the
following decade. The expedition against Algiers was especially noteworthy, as it
constituted the largest amphibious operation conducted during the age of sail. A
fleet of thirty-five major warships and three hundred transports (including seven
steamships used to tow smaller vessels to shore) landed an expeditionary force
of 37,000 men near the coastal town of Sidi Ferruch (now Sidi Fredj) on June 14,
1830. This action, and the effective naval bombardment delivered to support the
attack against Algiers two weeks later, as well as the considerable logistical effort
required to sustain the expeditionary force from the sea through the following
months, showed the impressive level of professionalism and growing reach of La
Royale.12
Such reach was demonstrated further as French explorers continued mapping out the Indian and Pacific Oceans and annexing new possessions along the
way, from the Comoros off the eastern coast of Africa to the islands that would
become French Polynesia, while securing a foothold in Madagascar and greater
access to China through the Treaty of Whampoa in 1845.13
Nevertheless, the limits of French sea power in that era were exposed clearly
whenever it clashed with British benevolence, as would be demonstrated in 1839
and again in 1840. In the first instance, a French merchant had claimed property damages incurred during the civil unrest that plagued the early years of the
Mexican Republic, but failed to obtain compensation. Using this as a casus belli,
France dispatched a naval force to occupy Veracruz in December 1838; French
ships also enforced a blockade of the ports on the Gulf of Mexico. However, the
local authorities still refused to pay compensation. As the crisis dragged into
1839, Great Britain grew concerned about the resulting instability and the true
extent of French ambitions in the region. An RN squadron arrived on the scene
that March and soon forced a diplomatic resolution through an implied threat to
both parties. Mexico blinked first and agreed to pay.14 This apparent success of
France on behalf of its aggrieved citizen proved misleading, as it was British sea
power that actually resolved the standoff, while the French squadron would not
have been able to resist effectively had London favored Mexico in the dispute.
The limit of French influence was again in evidence the following year, during
the so-called Near East crisis of 1840. Although nominally subservient to the Ottoman Empire, Muhammad Ali Pasha had consolidated his personal power over
Egypt through the previous decades. He then undertook a military campaign to
move into those territories corresponding to today’s Israel, Palestine, Lebanon,
and Syria. These actions benefited from the support of France, which provided
naval and military instructors to the budding Egyptian army and navy in a bid to
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7
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grow French influence in the Middle East. This scheme backfired dramatically
when Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia signed the Convention for the
Pacification of the Levant (known as the Convention of London) in July 1840 to
guarantee the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. When Muhammad Ali refused to
recognize the treaty, the European powers dispatched a naval force that blockaded Egypt, neutralized his fleet, and expelled his troops from Syria and Lebanon,
leaving him in control of only the province of Acre (Israel and Palestine).15 With
France isolated within the Concert of Europe and unable to mobilize sufficient
naval strength to support its Egyptian protégé, Paris could only acquiesce in the
fait accompli, despite considerable outcry from the French public.
The thirty years following the Bourbon Restoration thus had witnessed a resurgence of the French navy, a renewal that provided successive French monarchs
with a potent instrument that often succeeded in influencing events in Europe
and overseas, within the larger framework of Pax Britannica. Nevertheless, the
events of 1839 in Mexico and 1840 in the Middle East had shown clearly the limits of that same fleet, particularly in view of Great Britain’s continued superiority
in traditional ships of the line. The trauma of the Near East crisis gave renewed
impetus to those who perceived that fast-evolving technologies should be leveraged to circumvent the Royal Navy’s supremacy at sea.16 Instead of attempting to
narrow the gap in terms of the classical sailing man-of-war, France perhaps could
initiate new building plans to launch increased numbers of steam-propelled warships that would make the British fleet obsolete at once and allow France to seize
the lead.
The proponents of such views came to be called the “Modernists” or the
“Materialists.” They claimed that material superiority of technical means would
trump simple quantity in numbers of ships of the line and those strategic factors
that historically had conferred an undue advantage on Great Britain, the island
nation, over France, the continental power with exposed coastlines and vulnerable colonies.
This discourse was particularly timely in view of France’s frail economy at
the time; it was in no condition to subsidize the building of capital ships on a
scale that would threaten Britain’s numerical lead. The failing monarchy of Louis
Philippe actually had to cut naval estimates in 1837 and directed that twenty of
the navy’s forty ships of the line be kept in reserve, as their timber would stay
preserved better ashore on the building ways than afloat. The experiences of
1839 and 1840, though, demonstrated that readying the ships for sea, mustering
and training the required crews, and acquiring the necessary stores to support
them could not be completed in a timely manner when faced with an unexpected
crisis.17
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Following the fall of the government of Adolphe Thiers over the Near East
crisis, further public outcry led to the convening in 1844 of a special commission
to study the use of steam technology at sea.18 This venue provided great impetus for the Materialists to promote their views, openly seeking “near equality to
England in number of ships and superiority in technical skills.”19 The commission endorsed such ambitions and King Louis Philippe agreed to subsidize this
plan through a large increase to navy estimates in 1846–47. This led to a “French
naval scare” in Great Britain and its rapid construction of new steam warships to
remain ahead of France.20
Although the February 1848 revolution in Paris and the ensuing instability
under the short-lived Second Republic impeded the growth of the French navy,
important resources continued to be dedicated to the construction of warships,
including the previously mentioned Napoléon, launched in 1850.21 By the time
Napoleon III proclaimed the Second Empire in December 1852, he already had
encouraged the growth of La Royale and gained important support in promoting
a modern navy capable of rivaling Great Britain’s.22 It remained to be seen what
use France could make of such an instrument as the emperor set about reasserting French influence in Europe and overseas.
NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE SECOND EMPIRE
Intent on renewing France’s imperial glory but aware of the limits of military
power for achieving a dominant stature in Europe, Napoleon III embarked on a
bold program structured around three pillars.23
First, despite the economic recession of the previous decade, France grew
prosperous through the 1850s as domestic industries were driven to modernize and leverage new efficiencies gained through the advances of the industrial
age. Although he proclaimed an imperial regime, the new monarch was careful
to nurture a free economy based largely on the liberal tenets of the time. This
made goods from France increasingly competitive on world markets, leading to
the development of considerable economic interests overseas as French business
acquired larger market shares around the world.24
This economic growth paralleled a renewed interest in colonial expansion, the
second pillar of the emperor’s program.25 France may have lost its most prized
possessions during the Napoleonic Wars but had managed to retain footholds
around the periphery of the British Empire and gained new possessions during
the following decades, from North Africa to the Pacific. Napoleon III sought
further expansion through the 1850s and 1860s, carefully encroaching on those
territories that did not involve direct confrontation with other European powers,
such as in Southeast Asia and western Africa. Public support for such endeavors
grew through these years as successive governments emphasized the community
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7
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of interests between the economic gains the Right sought and the noble purpose
of France’s mission civilisatrice, which was more palatable to the Left.
This imperial renaissance required a third pillar: naval forces to protect French
territories and interests around the world. Stability on the European continent
left the country’s land borders momentarily secured, allowing Napoleon III to
dedicate much attention to his navy as he sought the next opportunity to demonstrate that France had regained a place of influence within the Concert of
Europe. Another crisis related to the decline of the Ottoman Empire provided
just that. A seemingly insignificant dispute between France and Russia over the
responsibility to be “Protector of the Christians in the Holy Land” left Ottoman
leaders equivocating about which of the two countries would retain this nominal
title. Tsar Nicholas I used the opportunity simultaneously to challenge the growing influence of France in Constantinople and to raise anew a long-standing
demand for access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits. A first ultimatum conveyed from Saint Petersburg in February 1853 demanded the ceding
of all provinces between the Danube and the Dardanelles, free access through
the straits, and the protection of all Turkish Christian minorities. Confident
of the support of the other European powers, the Ottoman rulers ignored this
challenge—and the diplomatic crisis led to war.26
While England and France did not join the conflict immediately, they were
sufficiently concerned about Russian ambitions to dispatch naval forces to the
Levant once again. The ships made their way up to Constantinople in a show
of force, but Russia was undeterred, having already destroyed the Turkish Black
Sea fleet anchored in the Anatolian port of Sinope in November 1853 while Russian armies advanced across the Danube and into eastern Anatolia.27 Napoleon
III grew increasingly strident about an intervention to succor the “sick man of
Europe,” and Great Britain agreed to join France in declaring war against tsarist
Russia in April 1854. Additional naval squadrons were dispatched promptly and
expeditionary forces were embarked in British and French transports. Within
months, the coalition had secured control of the Black Sea, blockading the Russian squadron in the fortress of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula and repeatedly bombarding the city of Odessa.28
After a first foray ashore in June to stop the Russian offensive through Bulgaria, the combined expeditionary force was reembarked and landed in September 1854 to lay siege to Sevastopol itself. The remainder of the land campaign
became bogged down, and poor logistics combined with dismal sanitary conditions ashore to inflict a dire cost on the expeditionary force. The reputations of
both the French and British armies suffered greatly as a result of their lackluster
performance.29
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Nonetheless, after hostilities came to an end in March 1856, La Royale could
boast of several achievements.30 Napoleon III’s navy had acted as an equal to the
Royal Navy during several naval and joint operations, from securing command
of the Black Sea to transporting an expeditionary force of 28,000 men to the
theater of operations, successfully landing it first in Bulgaria and then outside
Sevastopol. The French navy was able to supply this force from the sea for two
years while keeping the tsarist fleet bottled up in port and providing effective fire
support to troops on land. Naval operations also took place along the periphery
of the Russian Empire, with smaller squadrons deployed in the Baltic and the
Pacific.31 These operations may not have affected hostilities in Crimea directly,
but they did result in Russia dispersing forces that were needed badly on the main
front. European politicians and strategists, especially in Great Britain, took note
of the French ability to operate large naval forces globally.32
The war left the French navy in an enviable position. It was the object of imperial pride for Napoleon III, while political circles and public opinion supported
continued investment in the fleet. Increased budgets were approved, allowing
naval architects to integrate lessons from the Crimean War into new ship designs that reflected the trinity of steam, the explosive shell, and armor plating.
France again took the technical lead and began work on the first oceangoing
ironclad, La Gloire.33 The new line of ships that followed was but one element
of a balanced force that was funded through the unprecedented naval estimates
of 1857. This milestone measure provided for “three fleets: one of battleships to
uphold France’s position in Europe, one of ships for foreign stations to make her
respected abroad, and one of transports and gunboats either to conduct colonial
expeditions or to land and support troops in another Crimean War.”34 This program envisioned the building of forty ironclads; twenty armored frigates; ninety
corvettes, gunboats, and other auxiliary units; and seventy-five troop transports
capable of embarking forty thousand men and twelve thousand horses.35
However, this naval renaissance came to naught over the course of the following decade. It remained shaped by preparations for a confrontation with Great
Britain. The French navy continued to seek near equality in numbers, superior
fighting efficiency, and the bold adoption of every technical innovation at sea
to gain even a limited advantage over the Royal Navy.36 Although France was
successful in repeatedly achieving technical superiority in the areas of steam
propulsion, naval gunnery, and ship’s side armor, each instance only gave rise to
another race—which the Royal Navy set about winning. Once Britain’s leaders
abandoned their affiliation with sail and the government allocated the required
funds, the country easily achieved a commanding lead in new construction by
the mid-1860s. Even the vainglorious Napoleon III had to admit that maintaining near parity was beyond French means, and the 1857 plan was scaled down in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7
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1863 and again in 1865.37 As for the fighting efficiency of French sailors over their
British counterparts, their grit was never tested during the years of the Second
Empire. Although La Royale continued preparing for a decisive engagement with
the Royal Navy, this did not come to pass, as a much more dangerous threat took
shape on the Continent, making the French navy seemingly irrelevant during the
country’s hour of greatest need.
1870: NEITHER VICTORIOUS NOR DEFEATED
The French amirauté (admiralty) was ill prepared for the coming war. Focused
on the competition with Great Britain and expansion overseas, it had dedicated
little intellectual effort to figuring out how to leverage sea power against Prussia.
The Marine impériale benefited from an overwhelming preponderance over the
fledgling Norddeutsche Bundesmarine (North German Confederation Navy),
formed in 1867. France could deploy some four hundred vessels (including
thirty-four ironclads) crewed by 28,000 men, while Prussia and its allies could
muster only 6,200 sailors manning thirty-four vessels, of which only five could
be considered seagoing ironclads.38
Such superiority would be of little use, however, unless it could be employed
effectively against the enemy, and the French quickly elaborated naval plans to do
just that. They sought to defeat ironclads at sea, raid the naval bases at Wilhelms
haven on the North Sea and Kiel in the Baltic, blockade commercial ports and
destroy shipping overseas, and land an army corps on the northern coast of the
North German Confederation to relieve pressure on the main land front.39
Such objectives may have appeared sound at the time, but they were based
on flawed assumptions. Once war came, the Confederation Navy stayed in port,
denying French admirals the opportunity to destroy enemy capital ships—the
ironclads—through battle at sea. Raids against Wilhelmshaven and Kiel were
considered, but new technologies such as marine mines and torpedoes launched
from shore, combined with formidable coastal batteries, made such expeditions
too risky. French ships were more successful in blockading enemy cruisers isolated in neutral ports overseas, but the interdiction of commercial shipping was
undermined greatly by France’s reluctance to stop those ships that sailed under
the red ensign (flown by British merchant vessels), fearing to alienate Great Britain. Lastly, prewar studies had concluded that amphibious operations against the
enemy coast could take place only in the Baltic, in view of the extensive shallows
along the North Sea shore. Such an expedition, in turn, would require an active
alliance with Denmark, or at least its benevolent neutrality—neither of which was
forthcoming during the hostilities.40
Worst, though, was that all these contingencies presupposed the readiness
of the French fleet to undertake such operations at the beginning of hostilities
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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in 1870, but this was not the case. When Prince Otto von Bismarck, ministerpresident of the Kingdom of Prussia and chancellor of the North German Confederation, succeeded in goading Napoleon III into declaring war on July 19,
French naval leaders were caught unprepared to launch large-scale operations.
Many ships were in refit, while others remained deployed overseas; large numbers of reservists were unavailable, as they already had sailed for the summer
Newfoundland fisheries; and orders for the required stocks of coal, food, and
other supplies had yet to be fulfilled. These challenges, compounded by the decision to maintain large forces in the Mediterranean to guard transports ferrying
troops from Algeria to the métropole despite the obvious absence of a German
threat in that theater, directly led to the failure to intercept enemy ironclads returning home that summer after an extensive maintenance period contracted to
British firms.41
The French fleet eventually conducted two large-scale demonstrations off the
German coast, but they achieved little, and the single naval battle of the war was
an inconclusive engagement between two small gunboats (the French Bouvet and
the German Meteor) near Cuba in November.42 As the French army crumbled
and Napoleon III surrendered at Sedan, the fleet was ordered back to Cherbourg
in September to land its heavy guns for the defense of Paris. This was an inglorious end to the naval war, although French sailors would distinguish themselves
ashore in the following months.43
FROM THE SECOND EMPIRE TO THE THIRD REPUBLIC
Following an armistice in January 1871, the French government agreed to the
terms of the Treaty of Frankfurt on May 10. The Second Empire already had
given way to the Third Republic by then, following a populist coup in September
1870, but the monarchist Adolphe Thiers—the premier who had resigned in the
wake of the Near East crisis of 1840—eventually formed a provisional cabinet of
conservative, rural, middle-class politicians in February 1871. Priority went to
repaying the war indemnity, to put an end to the German occupation.44
Meanwhile, a climate of revanchisme quickly seized France, so the military
leadership set about rebuilding the French army—and studying the lessons from
the preceding conflict.45 Despite the exceptional performance of the navy’s officers and sailors ashore, the service’s future and its very raison d’être came under
close scrutiny at the time. In the wake of the navy’s inability to contribute to the
defense of the nation, many denounced the fleet as a mere instrument of imperial
prestige and challenged the legitimacy of continued investment in ships. Even
Thiers’s ministre de la marine, retired admiral Louis Pothuau, lamented that “[a]ll
our efforts must be concentrated on land. Indeed, what good will a navy be to
us now?”46 This context gave rise to several radical proposals. Some promoted
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7
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the liquidation of all naval assets except those required for close coastal defense.
Others sought to retain just a few sailing ships to train personnel who would be
mobilized in the event of war to man a fleet of commerce destroyers improvised
from existing merchant vessels.47
Nevertheless, Pothuau was able in 1872 to deliver naval estimates along
more conservative lines, shaping the Marine nationale for the next two decades.
Although the budget was cut dramatically from 210 to 146 million francs and
severely curtailed the original building plan of 1857, the program of 1872 still
envisioned a fleet of 215 ships—namely, twenty-six ironclad battleships, thirtyfour cruisers, twenty coastal-defense ships, eighteen corvettes, thirty-two gunboats, twenty-five troop transports, and sixty auxiliary vessels.48 While a pale
reflection of Napoleon III’s ambition to build a navy of 430 ships, this mix did
reflect a remarkable continuity in seeking a balanced force that encompassed
units of the line for fleet engagements, cruisers and gunboats for overseas work,
and troop transports for amphibious operations. Such a construct was required
to pursue the obligations that Minister Pothuau envisioned in 1872: maintain a
battle and training fleet at home (the Squadron of Evolutions), defend stations
overseas, renew the fleet’s material readiness, and sustain schools ashore to continue generating officers and sailors trained in the technical skills that modern
warfare required.49
This plan showed some willingness to take into account lessons learned from
past conflicts, such as the continued requirement for troop transports that had
become evident during the Crimean War, and to acknowledge contemporary
practicalities, such as the necessity for a colonial power with worldwide interests
to deploy long-range cruisers and smaller gunboats. Nevertheless, most senior
officers continued to posit that any future confrontation at sea would take the
shape of a Nelsonian engagement between massed fleets in a replay of Trafalgar,
regardless of the technical innovations that had occurred since 1805. Some earlier
authors—namely, Baron Pierre-Barthélémy Portal (minister for the navy and the
colonies, 1818–21) and Vice Admiral Jean-Baptiste Grivel, in the 1830s—had
professed their belief in guerre de course (commerce warfare) as a viable alternative to seeking an engagement with the Royal Navy’s main battle fleet, but few
championed this approach in the early days of the Third Republic.50
After the Thiers government relinquished power in 1873, the program of 1872
was pursued haphazardly even as the British navy was gaining strength from the
building plans initiated in the 1860s.51 Meanwhile, Russia as well as Germany
and newly unified Italy launched extensive shipbuilding programs that sought
to incorporate the latest technological innovations and lessons learned from the
recent American Civil War; they all rapidly whittled away at France’s advantage
in modern warships.52
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The context was ripe for a new strategy that sought to move beyond the Nelsonian tradition by leveraging technological innovations to allow France to resume
its position as an influential continental power even as it faced an array of new
opponents at sea. But it remained to be seen who would seize this opportunity.
THE RISE OF THE JEUNE ÉCOLE . . .
The French Materialists of the 1840s had sought but failed to define a strategy
that would shake Great Britain’s command of the sea through technological
advances. One author eventually commented on the potential for technology
to undermine such numerical superiority in a new way, promoting a form of
asymmetric warfare and laying the foundation for what would mature into the
Jeune École in the following decades. Captain Baron Richild Grivel, son of the
previously mentioned Vice Admiral Grivel, in 1869 published an important essay
built on two fundamental assertions. First, the French historical experience had
shown that great encounters between battle fleets represented a severe danger to
the weaker naval power. Second, the French navy did not face one kind of enemy
but two, in that in the future it likely would be called on to confront a powerful
Great Britain on the one hand and continental powers, weaker in terms of naval
strength, on the other. Building a fleet solely dedicated to challenging RN command of the sea was futile. The Marine nationale should be organized to confront
the navies of those weaker powers through fleet engagements and undermine
England’s command of the sea through commerce raiding.53 Such a proposition
was not that revolutionary in and of itself, but it did underline a critical vulnerability for Great Britain, as Arne Røksund covered so well in his 2007 study, The
Jeune École: The Strategy of the Weak.
Grivel concluded that, instead of attacking Britain’s strongest point—the twenty
thousand cannon of the Royal Navy—France should aim for its weak spot—the
fifty thousand merchant vessels transporting the riches on which British prosperity depended. He argued that this was a form of warfare in which France would be
able to engage for an indefinite period; however, it was not likely that this cruiser
warfare would have to last longer than a couple of years, since most certainly it
would lead to a substantial rise in insurance rates, and after two or three years
no one would entrust goods to British ships. Britain’s principal source of national
wealth would dry up.54
In the 1870s, this proposal was explored further by another serving naval officer, Captain Théophile Aube, who would rise to the rank of admiral and implement his ideas as ministre de la marine a decade later. He took Grivel’s emphasis
on commerce warfare one step further by dethroning the ship of the line as the
foundation of naval power. He described a future when technological advances
would slow down and fleets would mature to a steady state, somewhat akin to the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7

Winter2018Review.indb 104

12

11/1/17 9:56 AM

Canuel: From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune Ecole

CANUEL

105

latter part of the age of sail. All naval powers eventually would achieve the same
level of technological development and qualitative readiness, reaching a stage
in which in any given conflict one fleet’s superiority would be obvious solely on
the basis of numbers. As the weaker side then would not risk its battleships, the
guerre d’escadre (fleet engagement) would be obsolete.55 Aube was also a fervent
colonialist who believed that the strength of nations would depend on their
overseas possessions. Hence, while accepting, in the wake of the Franco-Prussian
War, the requirement to rebuild the army to secure the country’s land borders, he
proposed that guerre de course would be key to maintaining access to colonies
and severing an enemy’s link to such resources overseas, be it a maritime or continental power. This train of thought eventually caused Aube, unlike Grivel, to
posit that commerce warfare would constitute the strategy of choice against both
superior and inferior naval powers, and that the humble torpedo boat would be
the new “capital ship.”56
This approach came to be known as the Jeune École, the “Young School,”
as its proponents were often those younger officers willing to challenge their
seniors who appeared to stand for the status quo and the primacy of the ship
of the line. The debate grew through the late 1870s and into the 1880s as most
navies, including those of France and Great Britain, acquired torpedo boats and
fast cruisers that prioritized speed and quick-firing armament over armor and
heavy guns. Advocates of the torpedo boat were encouraged greatly by the initial
success of these craft during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, especially when
a Russian force conducted the first recorded engagement of enemy vessels with
ship-launched, self-propelled torpedoes in January 1877.57 Further success ensued when two torpedo boats joined France’s Far East Squadron, commanded by
Admiral Amédée Courbet, then engaged in the Sino-French War of 1884–85.58
The hostilities (resulting from the clash of influence between the two powers over
Vietnam) were marked by several engagements in which torpedo boats played
some role and inflicted actual damages on modern Chinese ironclads acquired
from European yards.
Proponents of the Jeune École seized on these isolated episodes as they took
the debate over the future of the French navy to the public. Publicists and radical
pamphleteers, such as journalist Gabriel Charmes, built on the academic work of
serving and retired officers to vilify the naval hierarchy for the apparent shortcomings of 1870. They also denounced the reluctance of the powers that be to
endorse new technologies and fashion a revolutionary doctrine that would support French policies better on the Continent and overseas.59
The Concert of Europe had crumbled in the wake of the Franco-Prussian
War and Germany’s imperial ambitions signaled a renewed scramble for colonies. The race for territories greatly increased tensions between France and its
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continental neighbors (particularly Germany and Italy), as well as with Great
Britain. Public debate in France reached such a crescendo that it again caused a
naval scare across the Channel. The British government resigned itself to another
round of expensive shipbuilding in 1884—including that of a large number of
torpedo boats to fill the gap with France—and in the Naval Defence Act of 1889
announced its intention to maintain a two-power standard.60
The naval debate in France took on a unique dimension as it became complicated by the political fractures that plagued the Third Republic. During the
1870s, as the presidency passed from Thiers to army marshal Patrice de MacMahon (in power from 1873 to 1879), successive cabinets had grown increasingly
conservative and promonarchical. However, the Left ultimately rebounded and
gained sufficient seats in the National Assembly to govern for most of the 1880s,
engaging in a wide range of reforms that affected all facets of French society.61
The reformist wave eventually reached the Marine nationale through the assembly’s Budget Committee, where republican deputies, led by Étienne Lamy,
militated for remodeling the navy’s administration, its personnel policies, and
eventually its overall strategy.62 Officers of the Jeune École saw this as an opportunity to promote their views. They allied themselves with radical deputies, passing
on position papers and selective information on technological advances, often
covertly. Meanwhile, Charmes and other publicists attended meetings of the
committee to promote their views. The discourse from the Left became increasingly strident, to the point of identifying the battleship as a symbol of a timorous
naval leadership that was repressive of sailors, while painting the torpedo boat
as an instrument better suited to promote republican ideas at home and abroad.
Senior naval leaders reacted by moving closer to politicians of the Right.63
Several of the Budget Committee’s reforms were implemented under Auguste
Gougeard, a retired naval captain with republican views who was appointed
minister in 1881.64 It was under Aube, however, that the Jeune École reached its
zenith. Ministre de la marine from January 7, 1886, to May 30, 1887, the retired
admiral immediately ordered that all work be stopped on the construction of four
battleships so as to concentrate on the alternative fleet he had been promoting for
the previous fifteen years. He submitted estimates for a renewed “building program that included six large and ten small cruisers, twenty large torpedo boats for
use against other torpedo boats, fifty bateaux-canons, one hundred regular torpedo boats, and three armored coast-defence ships for use as torpedo boat mother
ships.”65 The fleet was redistributed into three groups: the aging battle fleet was
concentrated at Toulon, as an offensive force against the growing Italian navy;
older torpedo craft and coastal-defense ships were assembled in Cherbourg, as
a defensive force covering the Channel against Great Britain and Germany; and
commerce-raiding cruisers were based at Brest, to wage guerre de course in the
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Atlantic and beyond. In addition, funds were sought for the establishment of a
major naval base at Bizerte, Tunisia, as well as a string of coaling stations in the
colonies to support those commerce raiders that would deploy around the world
in any conflict with Great Britain.
. . . AND ITS FALL
As the recognized father of the Jeune École, Aube left the department in 1887
with his head high, having done more than anybody else in a very short time to
lay the foundations for a renewed fleet. These foundations, though, would crumble almost immediately, leaving the French navy a dysfunctional entity right up to
the First World War. This resulted from the practical limitations of torpedo boats,
the continued fracture of the French naval leadership along political-affiliation
lines, and the hard realities of international relations in the 1890s.
Despite these difficult circumstances, the radicalization of his supporters,
their more extravagant claims, and the demonization of those opposed to his
ideas, one must recognize Aube’s intellectual probity. While dramatically altering the navy’s building plans, he ordered the conduct of les grandes manœuvres
(large-scale exercises at sea) to test the ability of torpedo boats under realistic
conditions and to develop doctrine and tactics for their employment, whereas
such issues previously had been confined largely to the realm of the rhetorical. He instructed the senior leadership to draft extensive lessons learned from
these exercises, and allowed naval officers who wished to make public their first
impressions—positive or negative—to publish them in civilian journals.66
Minister Aube first dispatched torpedo boats on a long and arduous transit
under rough winter conditions from Cherbourg, Lorient, and Brest in the Atlantic to Toulon in the Mediterranean. Summer maneuvers then were organized to
set the torpedo boat fleet against the battleships of the Squadron of Evolutions.
Although the government resigned in May of the following year, forcing him
from office, Aube already had ordered for the summer of 1887 an even more
ambitious exercise—in which groups of torpedo boats would have attempted to
intercept a battle fleet traveling from Toulon to Brest—but his successor canceled
it. There were no follow-on maneuvers, as objective study of such experiments
at sea quickly was distorted to suit both supporters and opponents of the Jeune
École along the political lines that were dividing the Marine nationale.67
It was admittedly very difficult to analyze the results of such exercises in
any case.68 They seemed to confirm both the potential of the torpedo boat—its
ability to use its maneuverability to close the battleship to weapon-engagement
range—and its fundamental flaws when compared with larger units better suited
for long-range cruising, with better sea-keeping qualities and autonomy beyond
the few days for which a torpedo boat realistically could be expected to sustain
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Winter2018Review.indb 107

15

11/1/17 9:56 AM

108

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 7

itself. As well, the maneuvers did not explore fully the potential countermeasures
against such new craft, nor did they attempt to determine how torpedo boats
could detect and intercept enemy warships beyond their very limited visual
range, as the maneuvers had been controlled to ensure contact between opposing fleets.
As successive governments in Paris grew more moderate over the following
years, the influence of the Jeune École rapidly waned, but did not disappear altogether. The technology existed, and several of its proponents were now senior
officers who still believed the torpedo boat offered some potential for use, on
the basis of their interpretation of the 1886 maneuvers. Cabinet instability also
greatly complicated the formulation of enduring policies, as no fewer than twenty
navy ministers were appointed between December 1887 and February 1906. Each
tried to impose his imprimatur on the institution, but seldom was in office long
enough to secure lasting reforms.69
Meanwhile, the competition for influence in Europe and the race for colonies overseas continued unabated. New coalitions took shape on the Continent
to replace the Bismarckian order, and the powers of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) engaged in sizable shipbuilding programs.
The growth of European battle fleets was fueled in part by the teachings of an
American sailor and scholar, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who gathered a
very large and enthusiastic following in the United States and Europe following
the publication in 1890 of his classic, The Influence of Sea Power upon History.70
This book marked the resurgence of the “historical school” and sought to affirm
the primacy of the battleship, a concept immediately endorsed in most European
capitals—with the exception of Paris, where controversy continued between the
Jeune École and the partisans of the main battle line.
While domestic and international politics grew increasingly complex, the
readiness of the French fleet declined. By 1889, eleven older, wooden-hulled,
armor-plated ironclads still were part of the battle line, while only one cruiser
could achieve a speed of eighteen knots; the others—legacies from the Second
Empire shipbuilding program—could maintain fourteen knots at best, well below
the capability of other European powers’ modern construction. Similar inferiority also applied to the characteristics of endurance, range, gun caliber and rate of
fire, and armor strength.71
This state of confusion was evident in the landmark program of 1890. Although the measure annulled many of the projects Aube had promoted in 1886
and aimed at responding to Britain’s Naval Defence Act of 1889 as well as the
threat of the Triple Alliance, it still paid lip service to the Jeune École through
an eclectic mix of platforms: twenty-four battleships, thirty-six cruisers, forty
high-seas torpedo boats, fifteen coastal-defense ships, 220 smaller torpedo
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boats, and a foreign-station fleet of thirty-four cruisers. But the construction of
ten battleships, forty-five cruisers, and over one hundred torpedo boats over the
next decade would have been required to bring the fleet up to such strength—and
even this was well beyond the capacity of French shipyards. The incoherence of
the plan was obvious, as funds for the development of a naval base at Bizerte; the
provision of coaling stations overseas; and the construction of torpedo boat tend
ers, or mother ships—essential elements for the conduct of commerce warfare
overseas and torpedo boat operations beyond the coasts of France—were not included.72 Such confusion continued in another plan crafted in 1894; in the words
of one historian, it intended to make everybody happy, with “a few scout cruisers
and some battleships for the admirals and a lot of torpedo craft and some special
commerce-raiding cruisers for the Jeune École.”73
Great Britain also regained its place as France’s most likely enemy in the late
1880s, ranking above even Germany as a result of the ongoing competition for
colonies.74 When France’s Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand reached the isolated
post of Fashoda (now Kodok) in southern Sudan in 1898, he soon faced a much
larger force under British major general Sir Horatio Herbert Kitchener, and
France and Great Britain prepared for war.75
Had the confrontation turned into an armed clash on the shores of the White
Nile, the final decision likely would have been determined at sea. The British
strategy would have leveraged an overwhelming advantage in modern battleships and cruisers simultaneously to annihilate the aging French battle fleet in the
Mediterranean, had it dared to come out; intercept and destroy any expeditionary force sent from the métropole to Africa; blockade France’s ports; destroy the
country’s commercial shipping; and mop up isolated French colonies.
In return, even under the most optimistic prognosis, while the Marine nationale could have inflicted damage on those British ships blockading French
ports close to shore and undertaken a campaign of commerce warfare overseas,
the latter would not have exercised a real impact until well after the face-off at
Fashoda had concluded. As for French torpedo boats, they could have conducted
small-scale raids against the coasts of England, but these actions likely would not
have threatened British ability to sustain forces on the upper Nile through Egypt.
Unable to support Captain Marchand in Fashoda, and fully conscious of the
Royal Navy’s superiority in terms of numbers, matériel, and strategic disposition,
France could only accept a humiliating diplomatic retreat. As Germany’s Kaiser
Wilhelm II reportedly commented, “Poor France. She acknowledges herself
beaten without a shot having been fired. That is abdication on the sea. They have
not read their Mahan!”76 France withdrew its forces from Sudan, and Paris and
London agreed that the watersheds of the Congo and Nile Rivers henceforth
would divide their countries’ respective spheres of influence.77
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There followed a period of intellectual introspection. The Jeune École rapidly
lost ground, leading to the appointment of Jean Louis de Lanessan as minister in
1899 and the promulgation of the 1900 shipbuilding program, in which the bigship navy once again came to the fore. The measure mandated the construction of
a first tranche of six modern battleships and five armored cruisers over the course
of the following eight years.78
Lanessan did not deny the importance of smaller, faster cruisers and torpedo
boats for specific tasks, and he promoted the establishment of “flying squadrons”
of fast armored cruisers in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean to support commerce raiders breaking out of French ports during an enemy blockade. He also
encouraged the growth of a fledgling submarine capability—the 1900 program
included requirements for twenty-six of the vessels, along with twenty-eight destroyers and 112 torpedo boats.79
However, Lanessan’s promotion of a balanced fleet centered on the battleship
took the navy back toward the time of the Second Empire, when it had cultivated
the ability to challenge any other navy at sea. In the words of historian Arne
Røksund, “Lanessan’s insistence on organizing the French Navy for a possible
conflict with Great Britain was, however, not solely based on threat assessments.
He pushed the argument one step further. He insisted that by using the most
advanced and powerful navy of the world as a standard against which to measure
itself, the French Navy would have nothing to fear from the navies of the Triple
Alliance.”80
FROM FASHODA THROUGH THE FIRST WORLD WAR
Fashoda did not mark the final passing of the Jeune École in France. Indeed, a
more left-leaning cabinet came to power in 1902 and the radical Camille Pelletan was installed as ministre de la marine. Until the end of his tour in office in
1905, he canceled orders for large ships and asked for more torpedo boats.81 The
fracture of the naval officer corps into deeply resentful factions whose members
sought to sabotage each other’s careers and who brought their conflicting views
to the public also continued into the decades leading to the First World War.82
Worse, even though Pelletan’s successor, Gaston Thomson, reinstituted the fundamentals of the 1900 program, French shipbuilding had fallen behind in the
naval arms race among the other European powers and the United States, which
was proceeding at full speed. Then, even as French contractors struggled to deliver the ships ordered in 1900, Great Britain fundamentally revolutionized naval
warfare by launching the “all big gun” Dreadnought in 1906. France ordered its
first equivalent only in 1910.83
This confused state of affairs would leave France by 1914 with an inferior fleet
that included only four dreadnoughts, compared with thirty-one for the Royal
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Navy, twenty-one for Germany, four each for Italy and Austria, seven for Russia,
and nine for the United States. The remainder of the French fleet amounted to
an unsystematic assembly of disparate classes of ships limited in their ability to
cruise and fight at sea as coherent units. Again France’s navy made only a limited
contribution to a war, even as the nation was waging a fight to the end on the
western front.84
Despite such strategic confusion at sea, naval policy eventually matured as a
reflection of a more realistic appraisal of the country’s security and foreign policy
needs, an objective assessment of the available technologies, and independence
from the prevailing party affiliation so as to secure enduring political support.
Accepting peaceful coexistence with Great Britain after centuries of intermittent
conflict and relentless rivalry, France agreed to the terms of the Entente Cordiale
in April 1904.85 The Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 seemed to confirm the
continued dominance of the battleship, especially after the Nelsonian confrontation at Tsushima.86 The importance of the battle fleet and the requirement for
interoperability with the Royal Navy came to the fore when France, with active
support from England, handily won its diplomatic confrontation with Germany
during the First Moroccan Crisis over the status of Tangier in 1905–1906 and
the Second Moroccan Crisis over Agadir in 1911.87 Such developments led to the
Anglo-French Naval Convention of 1912, whereby the two powers agreed to a
division of labor at sea. While Britain concentrated its fleet in the North Sea and
guaranteed the French coast against naval attacks from Germany, France based
its main fleet in the Mediterranean and assumed responsibility for the defense of
British interests in the region, including the Suez Canal.88
France supported this commitment with an ambitious shipbuilding plan that
the National Assembly approved in 1912. That program envisioned the construction by 1920 of twenty-eight dreadnought battleships, ten éclaireurs d’escadre
(battle cruisers), fifty-two torpilleurs d’escadre (destroyers), ninety-four submarines, and ten bâtiments pour stations lointaines (unarmored cruisers for service
overseas).89 France ran out of time for delivering this balanced fleet prior to the
German offensive of August 1914, but the precedent had been set and a focused
shipbuilding effort resumed after the First World War.
Wartime operations at sea did not negate all the precepts that the Jeune École
had put forward during the ironclad era. As naval historian Theodore Ropp
notes in his masterful study The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval
Policy 1871–1904, Admiral Aube had predicted—quite presciently, in an 1882
article—the course of a future war, elaborating that (1) the weaker fleet would
refuse combat and remain in port, (2) the stronger one also would remain in port,
owing to a fear of torpedoes, (3) and the only real activity at sea would be guerre
de course, (4) under which offensive actions against merchant shipping would be
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merciless. Ropp argues that “it is possible to view the events of the war of 1914–18
under exactly those four points.”90 Jutland and the Dardanelles notwithstanding,
the Hochseeflotte (German High Seas Fleet) and the British Grand Fleet stuck
to their bases, one as a “risk fleet” in Wilhelmshaven, the other moored in Scapa
Flow to preserve its numerical superiority. The torpedo finally came into its own
as a strategic weapon when married with the “submersible torpedo boat,” which
Germany unleashed in a campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare.
Aube and his contemporaries were right in their intuition that technology could
provide for the rise of a form of asymmetric warfare that would benefit the
weaker navy, threatening the supremacy of the battle fleet and strangling vital
lines of communications. The torpedo eventually would constitute such a threat,
but the Jeune École erred in focusing on a delivery vehicle meant to make the
battleship obsolete before the technology was available and proven. It was the
German submarines of the Great War that carried the torpedoes that directly
threatened Great Britain’s supremacy at sea, not the French torpedo boats of the
1880s. France’s famed student of strategy Hervé Coutau-Bégarie indeed mused
that “the fault of Aube was perhaps to be right too early.”91
Another flaw was the strident militancy of the Jeune École disciples. They
strenuously refused to listen to their opponents, neglecting to admit that technological advances would spur not only the rise of asymmetric warfare but the
development of defensive measures against such means, just as during the ironclad era the development of the explosive shell had been followed closely by that
of armor plating. To promote their views, the disciples allied themselves to radical politicians, which deeply fractured the naval officer corps amid the cabinet
instability that was a hallmark of the Third Republic, preventing the formulation
and sustainment of a single, long-term shipbuilding plan. This may have been the
greatest, if unintended, harm that the Jeune École caused, as the debate initiated
in the 1870s contributed to the country’s poor state of readiness at sea up to the
First World War.
This marked a very important departure from the tradition of political neutrality that had been observed throughout previous decades: “Ever since the
great purges of the Revolution [of 1789], the navy had not taken part in national
political life. The sole aim of the naval chiefs, regardless of their private political
convictions, was to keep the navy intact, not to preserve or support a given political order.”92 This largely explains the strength of France’s navy under Napoleon
III. From the Bourbon Restoration through the July Monarchy and the Second
Republic to the Second Empire, political neutrality assured continued support
from those in power, despite the social turmoil of the early nineteenth century.
With political will and public support in hand, French naval leaders set about
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/7

Winter2018Review.indb 112

20

11/1/17 9:56 AM

Canuel: From a Prestige Fleet to the Jeune Ecole

CANUEL

113

creating a balanced and effective force. This continuity in purpose crested with
the 1857 shipbuilding program, which laid the foundations for Napoleon III’s
fleet. Still derided by some historians today because it seemingly failed to make
a viable contribution during the Franco-Prussian War, La Royale nonetheless
served France well through the 1860s—as long as the emperor adhered to realistic objectives overseas and viable policies on the Continent. Even the lack of
results at sea in 1870 cannot be blamed squarely on naval leaders. They had completed a modicum of operational planning for war with Prussia, but they could
not have foreseen that their emperor’s diplomatic rashness and the disastrous
land campaign would deprive the fleet of any opportunity to execute those plans.
Study of this period remains relevant today for those involved in military
transformation during a time of geopolitical and strategic uncertainty set against
a background of spiraling and ostensibly unaffordable technological innovations.
Naval policy under the Second Empire proved correct, but it failed to explain
itself to politicians and the public alike, as no cogent theoretical and doctrinal
framework supported it. This greatly facilitated the opening of a path for “technological determinists,” such as Richild Grivel and Aube, who laid out such a
discourse, one that promoted future technological developments to undermine
the position of proponents of the status quo. A large part of that vision would
prove correct in the longer term, but the immediate adoption of such a strategy
to shape contemporary naval policy failed France because it did not provide the
means to support the country’s current objectives. The situation was made only
worse when the debate assumed political overtones, introducing a stridency that
left the Marine nationale deeply divided. Shipbuilding programs repeatedly were
altered as governments came and went, resulting at the turn of the century in an
assembly of disparate “sample ships” in lieu of the balanced fleet achieved previously under Napoleon III.
The Second Empire and the Third Republic demonstrated in their very distinct ways that naval policy and strategy must remain closely aligned to deliver affordable means in support of a country’s realistic objectives at home and abroad.
This is an enduring lesson for today, when the future of modern navies remains
cloaked in uncertainty and controversy.
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